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Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of banking crises on manufacturing exports exploiting
the fact that sectors dier in their needs for external nancing. Relying on data from
23 banking crises episodes involving both developed and developing countries during the
period 1980-2000 we separate the impact of banking crises on exports growth from that of
other exogenous shocks (i.e. demand shocks). Our ndings show that during a crisis the
exports of sectors more dependent on external nance grow signicantly less than other
sectors. However, this result holds only for sectors depending more heavily on banking
nance as opposed to inter-rm nance. Furthermore, sectors characterized by a higher
degree of assets tangibility appear to be more resilient in the face of a banking crisis. The
eect of the banking crises on exports is robust and additional to external demand shocks.
The eect of the latter is independent and additional to that of a banking shock, and is
particularly signicant for sectors producing durable goods.
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11 Introduction
For the rst time since 1982 trade volumes are predicted to fall in 2009 by 11 percent (IMF 2009)
as a consequence of the simultaneous drop in demand and nancial troubles. The recent collapse
in exports following the unfolding of the nancial crisis has generated new pressing questions
about the relationship between banking crises and exports growth.1 In particular, it is not
entirely clear to what extent supply shocks, i.e. the restricted access to nance, due to a
collapse in the banking system are responsible for the drop in exports versus the more classical
demand side factors. With this question in mind, this paper analyzes the evidence based on 23
banking crises episodes between 1980-2000. In particular, we attempt to disentangle dierent
nancial channels through which banking crises can aect exports growth and to separate the
impact of these supply shocks from the external demand shocks due to recessionary episodes of
trading partners.
The importance of the link between nance and growth cannot be overemphasized and has
been extensively studied in the literature.2 Our study is particularly close to the dierence in
dierence approach originally proposed by Rajan and Zingales (1998) and followed by a number
of more recent studies (Beck 2003, Braun 2003, Fisman and Love 2003, Manova 2008a, Raddatz
2006) which substantially reduces concerns about endogeneity present in the nance and growth
literature. Building on a similar identication strategy, various recent studies have focused on
the impact of nancial crises on the industrial activity and growth conrming the hypothesis
of a credit crunch channel occurring at times of nancial distress (Berman 2009, Dell'Ariccia,
Detragiache, and Rajan 2008, Kroszner, Laeven, and Klingebiel 2007, Borensztein and Panizza
2006). However, none of them specically analyzes the impact of banking crises on export
growth and they are silent about the impact of sector-specic external demand shocks.
The impact of banking crises on exports is a particularly relevant empirical question and there
are at least two reasons why it diers from merely looking at the impact on production growth.
First, based on the ndings of the recent rm-level studies pointing toward the importance
of xed costs necessary to penetrate foreign markets, nancial constraints may impinge on
exporters more than on domestic rms and, therefore, the eect of banking crises on exports
could potentially be more adverse than on domestic production (Greenaway, Guariglia, and
Kneller 2007, Iacovone and Javorcik 2008, Manova 2008a, Muuls 2008, Roberts and Tybout
1997).3 Second, it is also possible that given the exporters are on average more productive
1"Twenty-eight out of 38 economies reporting November export data (as of January 13, 2009) show double-
digit declines relative to the same month in the previous year. On average, exports of the reporting countries
declined by 15 percent in November" (World Bank, January 2009).
2For a very detailed survey of the literature see Levine (2004).
3For example Iacovone and Javorcik (2008) show how Mexican rms, in order to exploit new export op-
portunities under NAFTA, had to prepare by scaling up their investments and rms unable to keep up with
2(Bernard and Jensen 2004, Bernard and Bradford Jensen 1999) they could also be more capable
of nding alternative sources of nance and overcome more easily the constraints imposed by
the credit crunch than other domestic rms.
Our paper is also related to the emerging theoretical and empirical literature pointing to-
ward the importance of nancial development as a factor shaping export patterns (Kletzer and
Bardhan 1987, Beck 2002, Beck 2003, Ju and Wei 2005, Hur, Raj, and Riyanto 2006, Becker
and Greenberg 2003). While these studies argue that nancial development matters for export
growth it can also be argued that the development of nancial system can actually be shaped
by exports patterns themselves as suggested by Do and Levchenko (2007). In this paper, we
are interested in the link going from a shock to nancial development, or a banking crisis, to
export growth rather than vice versa. Therefore, we treat a nancial crisis as exogenous to
export and test for this assumption in our robustness checks.
This paper provides several contributions to the literature. First, we show that there is a nega-
tive and signicant eect of banking crises on export growth as sectors more heavily dependent
on external nance are hit harder by a nancial crisis. Second, we show the importance of
distinguishing among dierent nancial channels. Unlike bank nance, inter-rm nance does
not appear to dry up at times of crisis as sectors more dependent on trade credit are not signif-
icantly more aected. Third, we show that sectors characterized by a higher share of tangible
assets are aected signicantly less by the crisis. This can be attributed to their higher ability
to provide collateral which results in a better access to nancial resources in a context of crisis.
Fourth, we show that the impact of \supply-side" shocks due to credit crunch is additional
and independent from that of \demand-side" shocks, the latter being especially important for
sectors producing durable goods. Conrming the importance of the \nancial channel" these
eects are stronger for deeper crises and in countries with a less developed nancial system.
These ndings are robust to a large number of robustness checks, in particular testing for
potential endogeneity and omitted variable biases.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing related
literature. Section 3 presents the data and empirical strategy adopted, before the results are
discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes summarizing the main results and outlining future
steps.
2 Related literature
To our knowledge there is no previous work looking at the impact of banking crises on exports,
however, there are several studies analyzing the eects of periods of nancial distress on the real
continuous investments are normally forced to exit export markets.
3economy. Some of them focus on the impact of banking crises on industrial output, while others
analyze the impact of other macroeconomic shocks on exports. From the rst group the work of
Dell'Ariccia, Detragiache, and Rajan (2008) is particularly close to our study. They show that
during periods of nancial distress industries that depend more on external nance are hurt
disproportionately more. Kroszner, Laeven, and Klingebiel (2007) conrm these results and,
additionally, nd that the contraction is more pronounced in countries with a more developed
nancial system. From the second group, Berman (2009) concentrates on the impact of currency
crises on trade and nds that impact of devaluation on exports is ambiguous. Even though, a
currency crisis has a positive eect on exporters, by improving their competitiveness, it has also
and adverse eect on their balance sheets by increasing the cost of their foreign denominated
loans. 4 In a related study Borensztein and Panizza (2006) nd that industries with higher
propensity to export are hurt relatively more during periods of sovereign defaults. Given that
banking crises are often accompanied by economic downturns, in a related study Braun and
Larrain (2005) show that during recessions industries that depend relatively more on external
nance get hurt more.
All above papers rely on the dierence-in-dierence methodology originally proposed by Ra-
jan and Zingales (1998). This important contribution allowed to tackle many of the econo-
metric shortcomings present in the nance and growth literature due to endogeneity prob-
lems. Such shortcomings aected much of the previous literature on nance and growth
(King and Levine 1993, Wurgler 2000) and had to be tackled using instrumental variables
(Levine 1998, Levine 1999, Levine, Loayza, and Beck 2000) or exploiting quasi-experimental
design as in Jayaratne and Strahan (1996)5. The main idea of Rajan and Zingales (1998) is
that industries dier in terms of their \dependence from external nance" because of industry
specic technological reasons. Therefore, when a country's nancial system develops those sec-
tors that rely more heavily on external nance to cover their investment will benet and grow
disproportionately faster. Subsequently several other papers followed a similar methodology.
Fisman and Love (2003) showed that when analyzing the link between nance and growth,
it is important to take into account not only the \bank nance" but also other sources of -
nance such as inter-rm nance. They nd that where the quality of nancial intermediation
is low, industries relying more on trade nance tend to grow faster. Braun (2003) provides an
additional dimension to understanding of the link between nancial development and growth
by showing that where nancial markets are not suciently developed the use of collateral
becomes particularly important as industries with higher shares of tangible assets tend to grow
relatively faster. Finally, Raddatz (2006) nds that better developed nancial systems reduce
4A similar result was pointed out for the case of Indonesia after the 1997-1998 devaluation (Blalock and
Roy 2007).
5For a detailed and encompassing survey of the nance and growth literature the reader should refer to
Levine (2004)
4output volatility in sectors with higher liquidity needs.
Literature that explicitly analyzes the link between trade and nance is also closely related to
our paper. Industry level studies such as Beck (2002), Beck (2003) and Manova (2008a) show
that higher nancial development will lead to a lower search cost for nancial intermediaries
and higher shares of exports in industries more dependent on external nance. Manova (2008a)
and Hur, Raj, and Riyanto (2006) also nd that at low levels of nancial development industries
with more tangible assets tend to export more. A potential explanation for this is that at low
levels of nancial development problems such as moral hazard and adverse selection will be
more pronounced and lenders will be more likely to require a collateral.6
Finally, rm level studies provide important insights into why nancial constraints are partic-
ularly relevant for exporters. These encompass a range of studies focusing on the importance
of existing sunk costs to penetrate foreign markets. Kletzer and Bardhan (1987) in a seminal
theoretical contribution develop a model where countries with identical technology and endow-
ments can develop a nance based comparative advantage in manufacturing goods requiring
more working capital, marketing costs or trade nance. Later Baldwin (1989) and Krugman
(1989) develop models where exporters have to pay a signicant sunk cost to enter foreign
markets and several empirical contributions conrm the validity of the sunk cost hypothesis (
Bernard and Jensen (2004), Iacovone and Javorcik (2008), Muuls (2008), Roberts and Tybout
(1997)). As discussed by Becker and Greenberg (2003) these costs are large and dicult to
nance from reasons including the delay between investment and revenue collection, limited
collateral and diculty to predict and verify revenues from abroad for outsiders.
3 Empirical strategy and data
3.1 Empirical strategy
In order to correctly identify the impact of banking crises on exports growth our empirical
strategy has to address the endogeneity and reverse causality issues. The same shocks that
trigger the nancial crisis might also aect the export performance. Similarly, the performance
of exports may be the trigger of the nancial crisis. Such concern about reverse causality could
be particularly serious in countries where the economy is not suciently diversied and relies
on just few sectors, the ones aected by adverse exogenous shocks. If the importance of the
exporters is suciently high in the portfolios of the banks, an adverse demand shock might lead
6Do and Levchenko (2007) argue, both theoretically and empirically, that the relationship between nance
and trade is not uni-directional and a country's nancial development is actually endogenous to the export
structure of the economy.
5to the inability of the exporters to pay o their loans and consequently to a banking crisis. To
tackle these concerns and correctly identify the impact of banking crises on exports growth we
adopt a dierence-in-dierence approach suggested by Rajan and Zingales (1998) that to large
extent mitigates both concerns. 7
Specically, we will test whether banking crises have an eect on exports growth, by asking if
industries more dependent on external nance are more severely aected by the crisis. With
this objective in mind we estimate the following equation that is very similar to the one used
by Dell'Ariccia, Detragiache, and Rajan (2008):
Xijt = ij + it + jt + Shareijt 3 + ExtFinDepj  Crisisit + ijt (1)
where Xijt corresponds to the growth rate of exports in country i, industry j and time t.
The inclusion of the lagged share of the exports of industry j in total exports of country
i serves to control for convergence eects. The larger the share the lower the potential of
the industry to grow, therefore the expected sign of  is negative. To control for long term
growth trends of industries at country-level we include a country-industry xed eect ij. The
remaining two paired xed eects it and jt control for country specic and industry specic
time varying shocks, these allow us to control country-wide shocks that may aect exports
(including macroeconomic and institutional country-wide changes) as well as industry specic
global supply or demand shocks that can aect exports growth. Because of the inclusion
of all these xed eects the only additional variables that can be identied are those that
simultaneously vary across all three dimensions, i.e. country, industry and time. In fact, our
identication strategy only exploits variation between sectors within country and therefore is
not aected by country specic, or industry specic, shocks. Furthermore, the inclusion of
the xed eects substantially reduces the risk of obtaining biased results because of omitted
variables.
Our main variable of interest is the interaction of the external nance dependence measure with
the nancial crisis dummy. Finding a negative  would suggest that during a nancial crisis
sectors relying more on external nance are hurt more than those that nance their investments
using mainly internal funds. Such result would conrm the existence of a nancial channel
operating during the crisis. As already mentioned, the main advantage of this identication
strategy is a substantial reduction of the endogeneity concern, i.e. slow growth of exports
translating into a banking crisis . Reverse causality will only be an issue if the relative export
performance of a given industry compared to other industries within the manufacturing sector
of the same country had a causal eect on the probability of the banking crisis.
A key issue is to dene a measure of external dependence from nance that is appropriate
7Furthermore in our robustness checks we address specically the endogeneity concerns.
6and relevant for exporters. Based on the previous literature we argue that exporters rely on
two main sources of nance. First, exporters are likely to need to nance their investments as
much as domestic rms and even more as conrmed by studies pointing to the importance of
xed costs and investment in order to succeed in export markets (Iacovone and Javorcik 2008).
Furthermore, given the larger volumes of production that exporters have to generate in order
to serve export markets they are also likely to be heavily reliant on working capital and trade
nance. These are going to be our main variables that will capture the reliance on external
nance and in the next section we will discuss more in details which proxies we use to capture
them.
3.2 Data sources and descriptions
Exports data, from UN Comtrade, are disaggregated at 4 digits ISIC Rev 2 and cover the period
1980 to 2006. There are 81 industries at this level of disaggregation, however, not all countries
have exported in all industries and years and therefore the resulting panel is unbalanced with
the number of observations slightly above 30000.
The information on banking crises is obtained from Dell'Ariccia, Detragiache, and Rajan (2008)
who identify 48 episodes of systemic nancial crises in both developed and developing countries.
Because we are only interested in the eect of pure banking crises we exclude all \twin crises"
when a currency crisis occurred jointly with the banking crisis. The rationale for this exclusion is
that we want to isolate the credit crunch channel from balance sheet eects. During twin crises,
when large devaluations occur, rms with high exposure to foreign debt will be hit particularly
hard. If these rms are also the rms highly dependent on external nance, the eect of the
crisis on exporters that we observe might be a consequence of their own balance sheet problems
rather than a consequence of the credit crunch due to the banking crisis. Finally, out of the
remaining 32 crisis episodes we only have disaggregated trade data for 23 crises in 21 countries.
We use Dell'Ariccia, Detragiache, and Rajan's (2008) database to identify the start of the crisis
but in the estimations the nancial crisis dummy is actually a \crisis window". This is equal
to 1 if country i faces a nancial crisis in year t as well as in the two following years .8 The
reason of using a crisis window is because we are not only interested in the immediate short
run eects of the crisis but also its medium-term eects. Furthermore, given the lumpiness of
certain investments it is possible that the impact of the credit crunch due to the crisis may
emerge with a lag as rms do not have to nance investment continuously.
The list of countries in the sample and their principal characteristics are summarized in Table
1. The sample is composed of countries of dierent income levels. Financial crises have aected
8As a robustness check we consider also two and four years windows and our results are substantially un-
changed.
7not only very poor countries with less than 1,000 USD real per capita income 3 years before
the crisis such as Nepal or Indonesia, but also highly developed countries like USA or Norway
with an income above 20,000 USD. A similar pattern is observable for the levels of nancial
development. The least developed country three years before the crisis has been Nepal which
has only borrowed only about 8 percent of its GDP to the private sector. On the other edge
Japan has borrowed almost twice its GDP. The crisis periods are spread throughout the whole
period 1980-2000, however, the majority is concentrated in the period of the late 80s and early
90s. Even though, we have excluded all the twin crises, the average devaluations in the three
year crisis windows are still substantial in some cases with an average of about 7 percent.
Except of Costa Rica, all the countries have experienced at least one recession in the period for
which we have data. Some of the recessions overlap with nancial crisis periods, but in many
cases both nancial crises and recessions occur at dierent times.
The measure of external nance dependence is based on data of listed US companies provided
in Compustat and obtained from Rajan and Zingales (1998). They compute this variable as the
fraction of capital expenditures that a company is not able to nance with internal funds. This
measure is a good proxy for the reliance on external funds to cover long-term investments and
dependence from banks. However, for exporters it is also important to be able to nance short
term needs such as working capital, which is often covered through trade credit. To capture
this component we will employ a measure proposed by Fisman and Love (2003) who dene the
sectoral dependence on trade nance as the ratio of accounts payable over total assets. Finally,
as described in the Section 2 various studies have emphasized the importance of collateralizable
assets in situations when the condence in nancial sector is low. Therefore, in our baseline
estimations we will be also using a proxy for the ability of an industry to provide collaterals.
This proxy is obtained from Kroszner, Laeven, and Klingebiel (2007) and is equal to the ratio
of tangible assets in total assets.
The values of the measures external dependence on bank nance, trade credit and tangibility are
reported in Table 2. The external dependence on bank nance is highest for the drugs industry
and lowest for the tobacco industry that is able to generate more cash ow than it needs for
its capital expenditures. High external dependence on bank nance does not necessarily imply
a high dependence on trade credit. For example the spinning industry belongs to the least
dependent on bank nance, but is the one of the most dependent on trade credit. Similarly
high tangibility of an industry, e.g. pulp and paper, does not necessarily translate into a high
dependence on long or short term nance. In Table 3 we show that the rank correlations
between the three measures are indeed low and each of them should be able to provide a
dierent dimension when examining the importance of the nancial channel during a banking
crisis.
In addition to the above variables we will be using a range of other control variables and alterna-
8tive measures throughout the estimations and robustness checks. Their construction and sources
will be described as we introduce them in Section 4. More detailed descriptions of variables
and procedures applied to the data are providedd in the data section of the Appendix.
4 Results
4.1 Summary statistics
Before proceeding with the estimation we will briey describe our main variables of interest.
Table 4 captures the dierences in growth rates of highly dependent industries compared to low
dependent industries in an out of a nancial crisis. An industry that is highly dependent from
nancial sector (i.e. at the top decile of nancial dependence measured using the RZ proxy)
experiences a reduction in its average growth rate by 2.2 percentage points during a crisis relative
to non-crisis times. On the other hand an industry characterized by a low external dependence
(i.e. from the bottom decile measured using the RZ proxy) tends to actually grow faster during
a crisis. The latter result may appear surprising but is easily explained by the devaluation that
often takes place during a nancial crisis. In fact, Table 1 shows how most of the crises, even
though they did not meet the criteria to be classied as twin crises, were accompanied by at
least a mild devaluation. Therefore, the increase in export growth in industries that do not
rely on external nance is likely to be a direct consequence of their increased competitiveness.
Even though the enhanced competitiveness applies to the high dependent industries as well,
their response to demand is limited by nancial constraints that are likely to be higher during
a nancial crisis. The resulting dierence between growth in non-crisis and crisis period in a
high dependent industry compared to the same dierence in the low dependent industry is 3.5
percentage points.
In case of the trade credit dependence, both the high dependent and the low dependent in-
dustries tend to grow faster during a crisis, however, the dierential between the two remains
almost unchanged when comparing to non-crisis times. This suggests that both types of indus-
tries have reaped the benets of higher competitiveness brought by the devaluation in almost
the same extent and the highly dependent industries did not seem to be aected by their sources
of nance drying up.
Finally, industries with higher shares of tangible assets experience higher growth rates during
crisis periods than during normal periods. On the other hand, the growth rates of exports
in non-tangible industries get slightly lower during crises. The dierential between high and
low tangible industries rises by almost 3 percentage points in a crisis situation suggesting that
possession of tangible assets provides for a buer and eases access to nance when the economy
9is experiencing nancial distress.
We will be estimating these dierence-in-dierence coecients more formally in the next section
using the Rajan and Zingales (1998) methodology described above.
4.2 Baseline regressions
Table 5 summarizes the results from our benchmark regression (1) estimated using OLS with
robust standard errors. We estimate the specication separately for each of the two major
measures of external nance dependence as well as for the tangibility measure in the rst three
columns and combine all of them in column 4. The results suggest that exports of industries
that depend heavily on external nance from banks suer signicantly more during a banking
crisis. Based on results in column 1 when comparing the exports growth performance of the
ship building sector which is in the top decile of external dependence with production of non-
metallic mineral products from the bottom ten per cent, in a crisis we observe a dierence in
the growth rates about 4 percentage points higher compared to non-crisis years. While exports
growth of high dependent sectors is reduced by about 4.1 percentage points (going down from
an average growth of about 11 percent out of crisis), the growth in a low dependent sector is
almost unchanged.
At the same time, it appears that not all the external nance during a crisis dries up. The sign
on the estimated coecient in column 2 of Table 5 suggests that industries more dependent on
trade credit are in an advantage during a crisis, however, the result is not statistically signicant.
This implies that in the past crises despite their adverse eect on the bank nance trade credit
provision was not cut. Trade nance is basically inter-rm nance provided to relatively more
nance constrained rms by more advantaged rms often with well established relationships
with nancial institutions (Petersen and Rajan 1996). However, during a nancial crisis these
privileges might be cut and consequently the rms might also reduce the trade credit provision.
This does not seem to have been the case. What can explain our result is that in exporting
industries the trade credit providers are not necessarily from the same country as the receiver
and therefore there is no reason to expect that trade credit provision would face substantial
constraints.
Consistent with our hypothesis that higher ability to provide collateral might ease access to
nance during crises when condence in the economy is low, we nd that industries with
higher shares of tangible assets are growing faster. The estimated coecient suggests that the
dierence in the growth rates between a highly tangible industry such as glass production and
an industry with few collateralizable assets such as drugs will be 5 percentage points higher in
crisis compared to non-crisis years.
10Figure 1 below visualizes these ndings by comparing the impact of a banking crisic on a sector
in the top and bottom decile of bank nance dependence and tangibility. A sector highly
dependent on external nance will experience a drop in export of 4 percentage points while
a low dependent sector will be almost unaected. The high and low tangible industries grow
both faster during a crisis, however, this eect is much stronger in the sector with higher shares
of tangible assets.
In the last three columns of Table 5 we show that all three eects are almost unchanged also
when we control for nancial development interacted with the proxies for external dependence
and tangibility. Financial development is dened as private credit in GDP and is taken from
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt (2009).
Figure 1: Impact of banking crisis on exports growth by sector characteristic
(a) Dependence on bank nance (b) Tangibility
4.3 Demand side eects
In addition to the supply side eect of the nancial channel we are also interested in the impact
of external demand shocks. For this purpose we construct an industry specic external demand
shock and estimate the following specication:
Xijt = ij + it + jt + Shareijt + ExtFinDepj  Crisisit + ExtDemShockijt + ijt (2)
The external demand shock for exporter i in industry j is dened as GDP growth of the
importer p weighted by the trade share of this partner in total exports of i in industry j and
summed over all partners that import goods from this specic exporter in this specic industry.
This gives a measure that varies across exporters, industries and time. The estimated positive
and signicant coecient on the demand shock variable in the rst column of Table 6 can be
interpreted as follows. Should the GDP growth of the only trading partner (100 percent share)
11decrease by 1 percentage point then the exports growth decreases by 1.18 percentage points.
Obviously, the eect of the same demand shock of importer p will have a dierent impact across
sectors dependent on the relative importance of this importer in each industry.9
To see whether a demand shock dierentially aects sectors based on their dependence on exter-
nal nance, in columns 2-4, we interact the demand shock with each of our three core nancial
measures. Unlike for dependence on trade credit and tangibility, where no signicant dierential
eect is observed, a positive demand shock abroad also leads to a higher growth in industries
relatively more dependent on external nance. This could imply that sectors relying heavily on
external nance are also more pro-cyclical as durable goods tend to. It is a well established fact
that during downturns the consumption of durables decreases disproportionately more than of
non-durables. To test whether our external dependence measure is not just a proxy for durables
in column 5 of Table 6 we include in addition to the interactions with external dependence also
similar interactions with a dummy variable taken from Kroszner, Laeven, and Klingebiel (2007)
which equals one when the sector is producing predominantly durable goods. Even though, the
coecient on the main interaction slightly decreases in its in magnitude, it still remains nega-
tive and signicant at 1 percent level. Exports of durables are not signicantly more aected
by a domestic crisis, however, consistent with previous literature they tend to be much more
aected than non-durable goods by demand shocks.
In Figure 2 below we visualize the results from column 5 of Table 6. It depicts a situation when
a country that faces a banking crisis simultaneously experiences a drop in demand from the only
importer. The drop of 2.8% that we choose for our simulation corresponds to the projection of
IMF for the United States in 2009. As the gure shows, the eect of nance is amplied by the
demand shock and the it is particularly pronounced in sectors producing durable goods whose
exports growth drops as much as 10 percentage points.
Most importantly for us, controlling for the demand does not aect the coecient of the interac-
tion of crisis and external dependence which remains strongly signicant and with a magnitude
that is almost unchanged compared to the baseline regressions. We also run similar tests using
a recession dummy instead of the GDP growth variable and nd the results to be consistent
with the ndings above. Therefore, from our analyses we can conclude that in a situation when
a domestic banking crisis is accompanied by a demand shock abroad the industries that depend
heavily on external nance will be double hit.
9The importance of demand shocks is shown to be very large also in recent works by Freund (2009) and
(Freund and Klapper 2009) who nd that this has been particularly important in the context of the current
nancial crisis.
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4.4 Deepness of the crisis
In this section we will analyze whether certain characteristics of the crisis or of the country
that experienced it have resulted in heterogeneous outcomes. We start by asking if crises
that are deeper also have stronger dierential eects on exports growth across industries. We
use the GDP loss experienced during the crisis to measure the deepness of a banking crisis.
The variable is computed as the dierence between GDP predicted from a linear or quadratic
trend and the actual GDP observed during a crisis. Based on the work of Braun and Larrain
(2005) one could expect that when a banking crisis is accompanied with a high GDP loss the
overall pessimism which is likely to prevail in the economy will cause that banks will be more
stingy with the lending resulting in a more adverse impact on the industries that rely heavily
on external nance. In Table 7 we report the estimation results of our baseline specication
augmented by the triple interaction of the crisis dummy, GDP loss and each of the nancial
measures in separate regressions. We report the results obtained from both using the GDP loss
computed from linear as well as quadratic trend. As the results in the rst two columns attest
higher GDP loss during a crisis indeed widens the gap between the growth of the high and
low dependent industries and increases the importance of a collateral as shown in the last two
columns of Table 7. On the other hand, the impact of a crisis on industries highly dependent
on trade credit does not seem to be aected by its deepness (columns 3 and 4).
134.5 Impact of economic and nancial development
We also attempt to understand whether the impact of nancial constraints arising during a crisis
is more or less pronounced in countries with higher GDP per capita or higher level of nancial
development. In the rst column of Table 8 we show that the triple interaction of the crisis
with bank nance dependence and GDP per capita is signicant but very small in magnitude.
This result implies that poorer countries hit by a nancial crisis experience a stronger impact
on their exports in industries that require more external nance than their richer counterparts.
The second and third column of Table 8, however, show that higher GDP per capita before the
crisis does not signicantly help industries highly dependent on trade credit or more tangible
industries. In Table 9 we look at the same issue dierently and, in line with the above results,
show that the fact that a country is developed implies a less severe impact of the banking
crisis.
We run similar regressions as for GDP per capita using nancial development measured as
private credit in GDP instead of the GDP per capita variable. As documented in Table 10 we
nd that countries with less developed nancial systems are hit harder. A conclusion one may
make from these results is that countries that are richer and more nancially developed might
also have additional nancing options outside of the banking sector. As shown in last column
of Table 10 this really seems to be the case. In economies with higher shares of other nancial
assets in GDP the impact of the crises on industries with high need of external nance is less
pronounced. 10
Results from this section are visualized in Figure 3. Panel (a) captures the relationship between
the nancial development and the dierence in the impact on exports growth in a high and low
dependent industry induced by a banking crisis. The values on the horizontal axis represent the
percentiles of nancial development in our sample, ranging from 0.07 in Nepal to 1.81 in Japan.
We show that when a crisis hits a country like Nepal, it will induce a dierential of almost 7
percentage points, while at higher values of nancial development the dierential decreases until
it completely vanishes. Panel (b), with GDP per capita percentiles on the horizontal axis, oers
10It is important to notice that there could be two reasons why our result dier from Kroszner, Laeven, and
Klingebiel (2007) who nd that the eect of a nancial crisis is deeper in countries with a more developed
nancial system. First, it is possible that exporters in countries with a more developed nancial system are
perceived more reliable and better able at dealing with foreign banks so in a context of crisis they can replace
their domestic loans with foreign loans - a possibility that is much less likely in the case of domestic producers
given their more limited relationships with international banks and exchange risk concerns. Second, our sample
of countries dier from the one covered by Kroszner, Laeven, and Klingebiel (2007) as their sample includes
many more poor and African countries while our sample is more representative of middle-upper income countries.
The reason of these discrepancies in the sample used is due to data availability and the fact we rely on the
dataset used by Dell'Ariccia, Detragiache, and Rajan (2008) while Kroszner, Laeven, and Klingebiel (2007) rely
on Caprio and Klingebiel (2002).
14Figure 3: Impact of banking crisis on exports growth: eect of nancial development and GDP
(a) Financial development (b) GDP per capita
a very similar picture. The higher the GDP per capita, the lower will be the dierence in the
impact on industries from opposite ends of the external nance dependence distribution.
4.6 Impact of policies
We have shown that banking crises bring by nancial constraints and frictions that have reper-
cussions in the real economy. A question arises whether there is anything for the policy maker to
do in order to mitigate these eects. Honohan and Klingebiel (2003) compile a list of measures
put in place by the government during the nancial crises. These include blanket depositor pro-
tection and two types of forbearance. Forbearance of type A allows insolvent or illiquid banks to
operate for 12 months. Forbearance of type B means that either there is type A forbearance or
some regulations are not enforced. Two additional measures capture repeated recapitalizations
and government sponsored debt relief for corporate or private borrowers. These ve policies
are captured as zero-one dummies. We borrow their measures and enclose them in our baseline
regressions in form of triple interactions with the measure of nancial dependence or tangibility
and nancial crisis. In addition to the rst ve measures we also include a policy total variable
which adds the dummies and gives the number of policies that have been implemented during
each crisis. The results are presented in Table 11. The information about policy interventions
is not available for all crises and therefore the number of observations is cut substantially. The
results from this constrained sample suggest that none of the general policies put in place in
order to ease the situation of the banks did not signicantly help to reduce the eect of the
crisis and some of the policies even enter with a negative sign.
154.7 Robustness tests
Throughout the estimations we have been nding a strong impact of the banking crisis on export
growth through a nancial channel. Our work is prone to several potential criticisms, therefore,
the role of this section is to assess the robustness of our ndings.11 We will assess them one by
one. First, the result might be driven by other accompanying events such as recessions rather
than by the banking crisis itself. Second, our nancial measures might not be robust to the
use of alternative proxies or they might measure other industry characterisitics not related to
nance. Third, our result might be driven by one country or by a small group of countries
sharing a common characteristic such as similar level of economic development. Fourth, even
though our methodology mitigates the endogeneity concerns, there are still situations in which
reverse causality might be an issue. Finally, previous literature has pointed toward biases
present in the dierence in dierence literature when the data is serially correlated. Therefore,
we also test whether our results are not driven by the methodology we use.
4.7.1 Is banking crisis just like any other period of economic distress?
Banking crises are often accompanied by economic downturns during which even healthy banks
may cut lending in response to balance sheet problems of the borrowers rather than because of
their own solvency or liquidity problems (Dell'Ariccia, Detragiache, and Rajan 2008). In order
to better understand if our results are simply driven by the recession we construct a recession
dummy as suggested by Braun and Larrain (2005). We then estimate our baseline model
substituting the banking crisis dummy with the recession dummy. The results are summarized
in Table 12. When we include the interaction between the recession and nancial dependence
alone we conrm that indeed there is an adverse eect of the recession which may be operating
through a credit channel too but the coecient is not signicant. Furthermore, when we also
include the interaction between nancial crisis and external dependence the sign and size on our
main interaction of interest, i.e. nancial crisis and external nance dependence, is unchanged
(column 2). We observe a similar pattern in columns 3 and 4 when we interact the recession
dummy with tangibility. When we include only the recession and tangibility interaction, the
more tangible industries seem to fare signicantly better when a recession hits. However,with
both interactions in one regression, the coecient on recession gets insignicant while the crisis
interaction with tangibility remains strong and almost unchanged in magnitude compared to our
baseline regressions. Alternatively, instead of the recession dummy we include GDP growth.
In this case we nd that a decrease in the growth rate of domestic income has a signicant
negative impact on exporters in intangible and high dependent industries, however, even in this
11Given that we obtain siginicant results for the interactions of crisis with external dependence on bank
nance and with tangibility, we will do most of the robustness tests for these two measures only.
16case the result on the banking crisis interaction is not substantially aected conrming there is
a separate eect of a banking crisis on export growth.12
4.7.2 Alternative measures of external dependence and tangibility
The measure of external nance dependence as computed by Rajan and Zingales (1998) might
not always be ideal. For example when looking at developing countries one could argue that
using the data of mature rms in the US might not give the best benchmark. Therefore, directly
from Rajan and Zingales (1998) we take the same type of measure but only computed for the
young rms that are likely to resemble more the rms in developing countries composing a big
part of our sample. In addition, this measure might also be more appropriate because rms
tend to rely much more on external nance in their early life. The rst column in the top panel
of Table 13 shows that even though the coecient on the main interaction weakens slightly the
results are qualitatively unchanged. A second concern that one might have with using US data
is that a country that has itself experienced a nancial crisis might not be the best frictionless
benchmark. Therefore, our second alternative is based on Kroszner, Laeven, and Klingebiel
(2007) who again compute the same measure but based only on data of countries that have
never experienced a nancial crisis. Here again, as shown in column 2, the results are very
similar to the ones from our benchmark regressions. To provide additional testing of whether
the dependence on external nance really matters in last two columns we employ two additional
measures both originally developed by Raddatz (2006): cash conversion cycle and inventories
to sales. These measures are meant to provide a proxy for more short term nancial needs
required to cover mainly the working capital. When we use these additional proxies interacted
with nancial crisis our main coecients remain negative and signicant but becomes smaller
than when we use the original measure. This suggests that it is particularly the long term
nancing that is hurt during a crisis which is consistent with our nding using the Fisman and
Love (2003) trade credit measure.
We do a similar set of tests for the tangibility measure. This variable is inherently dierent
from the external nance dependence and therefore we use a dierent set of proxies to check
its robustness. We take the alternative measures from Braun (2003). He similarly as Kroszner,
Laeven, and Klingebiel (2007) uses the book value of the property, plant and equipment in
total assets as the benchmark measure. However, he only constructs it at the 3 digit ISIC level
and for the period 1985-1995. For comparison we report the result of our benchmark regression
using this new denition of tangibility (see bottom part of Table 13). The coecient is slightly
lower in its magnitude but the result is consistent with our previous ndings. To better capture
12The positive sign on the interaction between GDP growth and external dependence from nance can be
both a consequence of the larger pro-cyclicality of sectors highly dependent from nance as well as a spurious
result due to the fact that exports are a component of GDP by construction.
17the actual value of the tangible assets we use Braun's measures of tangibility which has the
same numerator but is related to market value of total assets or total sales rather than to the
book value of total assets. In both cases the estimated coecient is positive, highly signicant
and almost identical in magnitude.
To summarize, Table 13 shows that when using alternative proxies for external dependence from
nance and tangibility our results slightly change in terms of magnitude but remains almost
unaected which reinforces our conclusions and conrms the robustness of our results.
4.7.3 Do the proxies measure something else?
Another concern with our measure of the external nance dependence is that it might potentially
capture other industry characteristics that are not inherently related to nance. We have
already shown that even though the high dependent RZ industries are pro-cyclical, durability
of goods produced is not what is driving our results. Another possibility is that the nancial
needs of an industry might be driven by the sophistication of the industry. Therefore, other
possible drivers could be capital or R&D intensity of the industry. We obtain proxies for
both measures from Kroszner, Laeven, and Klingebiel (2007) and include their interaction
with the nancial crisis dummy as additional controls in our baseline regression. As shown
in column one and two in the top panel of Table 14 inclusion of none of them weakens our
main result. Three additional industry characteristics that the RZ could potentially capture
are reported in the same table. The rst two, the share of 20 largest intermediates and the
Herndahl index are both capturing the dependence on intermediates and are taken from the
work of Cowan and Neut (2007). The reason to include these two proxies is their relation
to the complexity of the product. The higher complexity, the higher the number of tasks
involved in production and potentially the higher are the working capital and the external
nance requirements (Raddatz 2006). The third variable, the product homogeneity is based
on the Rauch (1999) classication of industries. Rauch classies a good as homogeneous if it
is sold in organized exchanges or if there is a reference price for it. A heterogeneous product
on the other hand requires building up a trading relationship. Therefore, we can expect that
a dierentiated product will have a higher xed cost of entry into a foreign market. If the
inclusion of this variable weakens the coecient on the main interaction it would suggest that
the Rajan and Zingales (1998) measure is a proxy of entry cost rather than external nance
dependence. Again inclusion of any of these variables does not aect the coecient on the main
interaction in any substantial way.
We do a similar set of tests for tangibility. In addition to the capital-labor ratio, R&D intensity
and product homogeneity we also include the interactions of physical capital intensity, natural
resources intensity and human capital intensity with the crisis dummy. The thought behind
18including the latter three is that tangibility might be spuriously capturing an industry charac-
teristics that provides a comparative advantage. If importers are highly dependent on the goods
of certain industries in crisis situations they will be more likely to support them by extending
additional trade credit or providing advance payments. On the other hand, in industries that
are more easily substitutable it is likely that importers will switch to other suppliers rather
than accepting less favorable payment conditions. If this was really the case, the positive and
signicant coecient on the tangibility interaction with crisis would be spurious. However,
inclusion of any of these additional interactions does not weaken the baseline result and also
none of them enters signicantly.
4.7.4 Country exclusions
We also perform several robustness checks to see whether our results are driven by a specic
country or group of countries. First, to test whether the results are spuriously driven by one
country, we run our baseline model given by equation (1) excluding one of the crisis countries
at the time. We do this for both, the external nance dependence and tangibility measures. In
both sets of 21 unreported regressions the coecient on our variable of interest stays signicant
with the sign and magnitude almost unchanged throughout the experiment.
Second, we exclude the poorest and the richest countries (Table 15) to see whether one of
these particular groups is driving the results. We nd that in both cases the coecient on
the interaction of the external dependence measure with nancial crisis remains negative and
statistically signicant. Given that the result is stronger after excluding the rich countries, this
is also consistent with our previous conclusion that poorer countries were hurt more by the
banking crises. Similarly, the estimated coecient on the tangibility interaction with nancial
crisis is positive and signicant in both cases, implying the importance of collateral in crisis
rises regardless of the level of economic development with the eect being slightly stronger in
richer countries.
Finally, we look at whether having countries in the sample that have experienced more than
one crisis might have aected our results. In Table 16 we show that the coecients on the main
interactions get slightly weaker after the exclusion. This result is not very strong but it seems
to suggest that in countries that have already experienced a crisis the eect of the credit crunch
gets especially pronounced.
4.7.5 Addressing endogeneity issues
Even though, our identication strategy built on Rajan and Zingales (1998) is much less exposed
to endogeneity concerns than typical cross-country models some concerns still remain. In our
19specic case an observed drop in exports in the high dependent industries might actually be
the cause of a banking crisis rather than other way round. However, as pointed out in Manova
(2008a), this argument does not come through so clearly for the tangibility measure. As we have
shown, there is negative correlation between tangibility of an industry and its dependence on
external nance, but it is not very high. Therefore, foreign demand skewed toward less tangible
industries should not necessarily translate in higher demand for external nance that could
potentially trigger a banking crisis due to a sudden stop in demand and inability of exporters
to pay o their earlier loans. However, for completeness we provide results for tangibility as
well as for the trade nance dependence measure. We do two dierent tests in order to show
that our results are not driven by reverse causality.
The results of our rst test are summarized in Table 17. The top panel reports our benchmark
regressions estimated only for sectors whose share in total exports three years before the crisis
was larger than the median share, i.e. large sectors, while the bottom panel reports the results
from the below median sectors, i.e. small sectors. If our results were driven by reverse causality
we would expect that the coecient on the interaction of external dependence and nancial
crisis in the regression of the large sectors would be negative, signicant and larger in magnitude,
while in the case of small sectors it would be insignicant. Our results show that while in both
cases the coecients are negative and signicant, they are actually twice as large in the case of
the small sectors that, given their sheer size, are certainly less likely to be triggers of a nancial
crisis.
In our second test we address the potential endogeneity by only looking at crises that can
be strictly exogenous, i.e. they have started as a result of investors reverting from certain
markets. More specically we focus only on crises that can be the result of a contagion from
other countries within the same region. The criterion to identify these crises is an occurrence
of a nancial crisis in a country in the same region one or two years before the exporter has
experienced a nancial crisis itself. We identify 14 episodes of this type and we rerun our baseline
regressions on this reduced sample. As shown in rst column of Table 18 the coecient on the
interaction of external dependence and nancial crisis becomes slightly less signicant, not
surprisingly given the substantially smaller sample we are using, but remains negative and very
similar in its magnitude to our baseline results. Interacting the crisis dummy with tangibility
leads similarly to almost the same conclusion as when using the whole sample.
4.7.6 Placebo crises
Bertrand, Duo, and Mullainathan (2004) show that dierence in dierence estimates can be
severely biased when the data used is serially correlated. Therefore, our nal robustness check
tests whether our results are really capturing an economically important eect or are completely
20spurious and driven by our methodology. In order to do so we take data for all countries that
never experienced a nancial crisis and we randomly assign 23 crisis episodes. We repeat this
200 times and then we test our model using each of these \placebo crises" interacted with the
external dependence as in our baseline regression. Our results speak against the spuriousness
of our ndings. The coecient on the interaction of external dependence and nancial crisis
turns out negative and signicant at the critical 5 percent degree of condence in less than 3
percent of cases, but also turns out positive at the same degree of condence in 3 percent of
the estimations. In case our results were spurious we would expect the negative and signicant
result to occur much more frequently. We do a similar experiment with the tangibility measure
and in this case the coecient is positive and signicant at 5 percent level in only 3 cases out
of 200. However, in 13 more cases it is negative and statistically signicant. This suggests that
once again our results do not seem to suer by an apparent bias, if anything it seems such bias
would work against us by aecting our estimates downward.
5 Conclusions
In the context of the current nancial crisis and the sharp drop in trade volumes this paper relied
on evidence from past banking crises to analyze the impact of banking crises on export growth.
With this purpose in mind we used a dierence-in-dierence identication strategy originally
suggested by Rajan and Zingales (1998) which allowed us to tackle various endogeneity concerns
and identify more precisely the impact of a domestic nancial breakdown on exports.
Our results reinforce the evidence about the importance of a healthy nancial system for exports
growth, or as suggested by previous studies the idea that nance may be a source of comparative
advantage and shape exports patterns (Manova 2008a, Manova 2008b). In fact, we nd a
negative and signicant eect of banking crises on exports growth with sectors more dependent
on nance growing by 4 percentage points less than sectors less relying on external nance
during a crisis.
Second, we nd that when analyzing the relationship between nance and exports it is important
to distinguish among dierent nancial channels as we show that not all nancial channels dry
up at times of crisis. In fact, the banking crisis does not appear to adversely aect exporters
particularly dependent on inter-rm nance in any signicant manner.
Third, the nding that sectors characterized by higher shares of tangible assets are signicantly
less aected by the crisis, arguably because of their ability to provide collateral, points toward
an important policy message. Guarantee schemes can be an important policy device in the
context of crisis to reduce credit constraints and support exporting rms to gain access to
nancial markets.
21Fourth, for the rst time, we simultaneously analyzed the eect of supply side shocks, i.e.
nancial crisis, and demand side ones. Our results conrm the importance of demand shocks,
especially for sectors producing durable goods. Interestingly, the eect of demand shocks is
independent and additional to that of the nancial crisis. In the present context this can
explain the magnitude of the drop in trade ows as a consequence of a double shock from both
supply and demand side.
Concluding, we have some limited evidence about the impact on exports of alternative policies
applied during previous banking crises which did not seem to have a signicant positive impact
on the exporters. Rather, it emerges that general economic and nancial development and
access to alternative sources of nance helps to reduce the adverse impact of a nancial crisis.
The caveat here is that the available dataset on policy interventions is rather limited and specic
policies targeted at exporters might be more relevant than general interventions intended to
ease the solvency and liquidity problems of the banking sector. Unfortunately, a comprehensive
database of export oriented interventions does not yet exist and thus constitutes an attractive
avenue for future research.
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To construct our dependent variable we rst exclude all very small trade values, i.e. smaller
than 1000 USD, then we compute the exports growth rates as log dierences and exclude
extreme growth values by trimming top and bottom 5 percent of observations. A similar
cleaning procedure is also used by Dell'Ariccia, Detragiache, and Rajan (2008) and Borensztein
and Panizza (2006), both using more aggregated 3 digit ISIC data, exclude 2 percent on each
tail. Furthermore, we test the robustness of our results by trimming the top and bottom 1
percent and our results are qualitatively unchanged, while the size of our main coecient of
interest becomes marginally larger in the baseline regressions.
The information on banking crises is obtained from Dell'Ariccia, Detragiache, and Rajan
(2008). Based on their denition, an episode of nancial crisis occurs if one of the following
four conditions is satised. First, emergency measures have been taken to assist the banking
system. Second, large scale nationalization took place. Third, non-performing loans reached at
least 10 percent in total assets or nally, costs of rescue operations were more than 2 percent
of GDP. Because we are only interested in the eect of pure banking crises we exclude all
\twin crises" when a currency crisis occurred jointly with the banking crisis. We identify these
using the standard Frankel and Rose (1996) criteria. They dene a currency crash as a 25
percent depreciation which simultaneously has to be also a 10 percent increase in the rate of
depreciation. Finally, out of the remaining 32 crisis episodes we only have disaggregated trade
data for 23 crises in 21 countries. The countries for which the data are missing are primarily
African countries that experienced a crisis early in the sample.
The measure of external nance dependence is based on data of listed US companies
provided in Compustat and obtained from Rajan and Zingales (1998). They compute the
proxy as a fraction of capital expenditures that an industry is not able to nance with internal
funds. To construct it they rst compute the median of all rms in each sector and year and
then they average the sectoral measures over the entire period of 1980-89.
The measure of trade credit dependence is obtained from Fisman and Love (2003) who
dene it as the ratio of accounts payable in total assets. Similarly to Rajan and Zingales (1998)
they base their measure on US data from Compustat.
Finally, the tangibility obtained from Kroszner, Laeven, and Klingebiel (2007) measure uses
the same procedure and data and is dened as the ratio of the book values of property, plant
and equipment in total assets.
All three measures, the external nance dependence, the dependence on trade credit and tan-
26gibility were originally computed for a mixture of 3 and 4 digit ISIC industries. Unlike many
previous papers that work at the three digit level, we use 4 digit trade data assuming that the
values of the nancial variables computed on the three digit level apply to all 4 digit industries
except the ones for which values are provided in the original papers.
27Table 1: Country descriptives
exporter years in sample GDP per Financial Crises Average Recessions # of sectors per year
min max total capita development devaluation Min Max In crisis
Argentina 1981 2006 26 6861 0.13 1995 0.00% 1985, 1988-90, 1999-02 63 79 75
Bolivia 1980 2006 27 895 0.24 1994 5.03% 1985 -1986 10 56 48
Colombia 1980 2006 27 1592, 2097 0.24, 0.34 1982, 1999 19.97% 1981-85, 1998-02 61 80 73
Costa Rica 1987 2006 20 3115 0.10 1994 13.33% { 52 73 62
Finland 1980 2006 27 19200 0.70 1991 16.97% 1990-93 75 80 78
Indonesia 1980 2006 27 572 0.27 1992 3.37% 1985-88, 1998-99 46 80 73
Italy 1980 2006 27 15064 0.49 1990 6.20% 1981-83, 1990-93 78 81 80
Jordan 1982 2006 25 2118 0.61 1989 13.32% 1988-91 40 64 48
Japan 1980 2006 27 31828 1.81 1992 -7.18% 1980-84, 1986 79 81 80
Sri Lanka 1980 2005 26 537 0.19 1989 9.17% 1987-89, 1992, 2001-02 45 73 62
Mexico 1987 2006 20 5080 0.17 1994 39.23% 1986-88, 1995 63 81 76
Malaysia 1980 2006 27 1992, 3241 0.52, 1.04 1985, 1997 9.11% 1985-87,2001 72 80 78
Norway 1980 2006 27 24644 0.72 1987 -3.23% 1981-82, 1987-93,2001-03 74 80 78
Nepal 1983 2000 18 159 0.08 1988 12.15% 1983, 1986-87 3 33 10
Panama 1987 2006 20 3371 0.42 1988 0.00% 1987-89, 1999-03 28 57 33
Philippines 1980 2006 27 939 0.33 1981 24.14% 1984-85 49 75 56
Papua New Guinea 1982 2004 23 625 0.27 1989 4.94% 1987-90, 2000-02 27 46 39
Portugal 1980 2006 27 6405 0.84 1986 -1.88% 1981-85, 1992-94 72 80 78
Sweden 1980 2006 27 22311 0.95 1990 5.31% 1980-83, 1990-93 73 81 79
Tunisia 1981 2006 26 1418 0.49 1991 7.79% 1988-89, 1993-95 52 74 69
United States 1980 2006 27 21418 0.83 1980 0.00% 1980-82, 2006 77 81 79
Notes: The table includes the list of countries that experienced a banking crisis in the period 1980-2000. The rst three columns give the span for which
we have trade data for each country and the total span. The values of GDP per capita and nancial development correspond to the magnitudes reported
three years before the country experienced a banking crisis. The column Crises species the year when the crisis began. Average devaluation is computed
for a three year crisis window including the starting year and two following years. The column Recessions summarized the periods in which the country
experienced a recession as dened in Braun and Larrain (2005). The nal three columns summarize for how many sectors out of 81 we have trade data
in each country.
2
8Table 2: Sector dependence on external nance
ISIC Industrial sectors RZ FL TANG
isic sector RZ rank FL rank TANG rank
311 Food products 0.14 25 0.112 3 0.37 13
312 Food manufacturing n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
313 Beverages 0.08 27 0.091 16 0.4 9
314 Tobacco -0.45 36 0.066 32 0.19 28
321 Textile 0.4 11 0.101 7 0.31 17
322 Apparel 0.03 30 0.111 5 0.15 32
323 Leather -0.14 34 0.055 35 0.12 36
324 Footwear -0.08 32 0.093 13 0.13 35
331 Wood products 0.28 15 0.088 18 0.32 15
332 Furniture 0.24 17 0.092 15 0.28 18
341 Paper and products 0.18 22 0.081 26 0.42 7
342 Printing and publishing 0.2 21 0.075 29 0.21 26
351 Industrial chemicals n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
352 Other chemicals 0.22 20 0.097 10 0.27 23
353 Petroleum reneries 0.04 29 0.118 2 0.62 1
354 Petroleum and coal products 0.33 13 0.096 11 0.46 4
355 Rubber products 0.23 19 0.088 18 0.36 14
356 Plastic products 1.14 2 0.099 9 0.38 11
361 Pottery -0.15 35 0.067 31 0.28 18
362 Glass 0.53 7 0.089 17 0.42 7
369 Nonmetal products 0.06 28 0.064 34 0.48 3
371 Iron and steel 0.09 26 0.094 12 0.44 5
372 Nonferrous metal 0.01 31 0.078 27 0.32 15
381 Metal products 0.24 17 0.088 18 0.28 18
382 Machinery 0.45 10 0.086 22 0.22 25
383 Electric machinery 0.77 6 0.082 25 0.21 26
384 Transportation equipment 0.31 14 0.105 6 0.23 24
385 Professional goods 0.96 5 0.072 30 0.16 30
390 Other industries 0.47 8 0.087 21 0.18 29
3211 Spinning -0.09 33 0.149 1 0.38 11
3411 Pulp, paper 0.15 24 0.065 33 0.6 2
3511 Basic excluding fertilizers 0.25 16 0.083 23 0.43 6
3513 Synthetic resins 0.16 23 0.093 13 0.4 9
3522 Drugs 1.49 1 0.055 35 0.16 30
3825 Oce and computing 1.06 3 0.083 23 0.14 33
3832 Radio 1.04 4 0.076 28 0.14 33
3841 Ship 0.46 9 0.101 7 0.28 18
3843 Motor vehicle 0.39 12 0.112 3 0.28 18
Notes: RZ is the measure of external dependence based on Rajan, Zingales (1998) calculated as fraction of capital expenditures
not funded by internal funds. FL is a measure of dependence on trade credit based on Fisman, Love (2003) calculated as ratio of
accounts payable in total assets. TANG is dened as property, plant and equipment in total assets and is taken from Kroszner et
al (2007).
29Table 3: Rank correlations between nancial measures
Bank nance dependence Trade credit dependence Tangibility
Bank nance dependence 1
Trade credit dependence -0.1142 1
Tangibility -0.3912 0.3386 1
Notes: The table reports rank correlations between bank nance dependence, trade credit dependence and
tangibility of an industry computed at 4 digit ISIC level. Bank nance dependence is based on Rajan, Zingales
(1998) and is calculated as fraction of capital expenditures not funded by internal funds. Trade credit dependence
is based on Fisman, Love (2003) and is calculated as ratio of accounts payable in total assets. Tangibility is
dened as property, plant and equipment in total assets and is taken from Kroszner et al (2007).
30Table 4: Summary statistics: Dierence in dierence
External dependence from banks
mean median N.
No crisis, high dependence 11.24% 10.22% 2467
Crisis, high dependence 9.00% 7.79% 396
No crisis, low dependence 7.44% 6.16% 2805
Crisis, low dependence 8.75% 6.18% 440
Dierences - Drop in Export Growth
High dep Low dep Dif in dif
mean 2.24% -1.31% 3.55%
median 2.42% -0.02% 2.44%
External dependence from trade credit
mean median N.
No crisis, high dependence 8.19% 7.32% 4397
Crisis, high dependence 11.48% 8.92% 688
No crisis, low dependence 7.94% 7.08% 2733
Crisis, low dependence 10.55% 7.76% 426
Dierences - Drop in Export Growth
High dep Low dep Dif in dif
mean -3.29% -2.61% -0.68%
median -1.60% -0.68% -0.92%
Tangibility
mean median N.
No crisis, high tangibility 9.47% 8.38% 2796
Crisis, high tangibility 12.00% 9.32% 440
No crisis, low tangibility 8.64% 8.04% 3793
Crisis, low tangibility 8.38% 6.76% 603
Dierences - Drop in Export Growth
High tang Low tang Dif in dif
mean -2.53% 0.27% -2.80%
median -0.94% 1.28% -2.21%
Notes: Bank nance dependence is based on Rajan, Zingales (1998) and is calculated as fraction of capital
expenditures not funded by internal funds. Trade credit dependence is based on Fisman, Love (2003) and is
calculated as ratio of accounts payable in total assets. Tangibility is dened as property, plant and equipment
in total assets and is taken from Kroszner et al (2007).
316.2 Appendix: Results
Table 5: Baseline regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Trade share -0.680*** -0.679*** -0.674*** -0.676*** -0.660*** -0.661*** -0.656***
(0.115) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115) (0.122) (0.122) (0.122)
RZ*Crisis -0.0536*** -0.0354* -0.0599***
(0.0171) (0.0181) (0.0172)
FL*Crisis 0.203 -0.240 0.274
(0.351) (0.366) (0.352)








Constant -0.153 -0.163 -0.160 -0.235 -0.0258 0.107 -0.413***
(0.143) (0.131) (0.135) (0.154) (0.195) (0.104) (0.107)
Observations 30753 30753 30753 30753 29126 29126 29126
R-squared 0.275 0.275 0.275 0.275 0.283 0.282 0.283
Notes: The dependent variable is the log dierence of the gross export disaggregated at 4 digit ISIC level for
the period 1980-2006. RZ is the measure of external dependence based on Rajan, Zingales (1998) calculated
as fraction of capital expenditures not funded by internal funds. FL is a measure of dependence on trade
credit based on Fisman, Love (2003) calculated as ratio of accounts payable in total assets. TANG is dened
as property, plant and equipment in total assets and is taken from Kroszner et al (2007). The crisis dummy
equals to one in the year of the crisis and in the rst and second year after the crisis and is zero otherwise.
The trade share is the share of industry exports in total exports lagged three periods. Financial development
is computed as private credit in GDP and taken from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt (2009). All regressions include
the exporter-year, exporter-product and year-product xed eects, coecients not reported. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Signicance (p-value): *10%, **5%, ***1%
32Table 6: Impact of demand shocks abroad
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Trade share -0.673*** -0.668*** -0.675*** -0.669*** -0.670***
(0.111) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114)
RZ*Crisis -0.0480*** -0.0418**
(0.0170) (0.0172)
Demand shock 0.0118*** 0.00790*** 0.0227*** 0.0185*** 0.00551**
(0.00198) (0.00231) (0.00833) (0.00475) (0.00241)














Constant 0.0239 -0.0471 0.144* -0.305* -0.254
(0.0707) (0.150) (0.0783) (0.157) (0.161)
Observations 31980 30753 30753 30753 30753
R-squared 0.274 0.277 0.276 0.277 0.277
Notes: The dependent variable is the log dierence of the gross export disaggregated at 4 digit ISIC level for
the period 1980-2006. RZ is the measure of external dependence based on Rajan, Zingales (1998) calculated
as fraction of capital expenditures not funded by internal funds. FL is a measure of dependence on trade
credit based on Fisman, Love (2003) calculated as ratio of accounts payable in total assets. TANG is dened
as property, plant and equipment in total assets and is taken from Kroszner et al (2007). The crisis dummy
equals to one in the year of the crisis and in the rst and second year after the crisis and is zero otherwise. The
trade share is the share of industry exports in total exports lagged three periods. An external demand shock
for exporter i in industry j is dened as GDP growth of the importer p weighted by the trade share of this
partner in total exports of i in industry j and summed over all partners. All regressions include the exporter-
year, exporter-product and year-product xed eects, coecients not reported. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Signicance (p-value): *10%, **5%, ***1%
33Table 7: Deepness of the crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trade share -0.682*** -0.681*** -0.677*** -0.680*** -0.675*** -0.668***
(0.115) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115)


















Constant -0.0968 -0.0989 -0.179 -0.129 -0.177 -0.199
(0.118) (0.118) (0.141) (0.122) (0.143) (0.152)
Observations 30753 30753 30753 30753 30753 30753
R-squared 0.275 0.275 0.275 0.275 0.275 0.276
Notes: The dependent variable is the log dierence of the gross export disaggregated at 4 digit ISIC level for
the period 1980-2006. RZ is the measure of external dependence based on Rajan, Zingales (1998) calculated as
fraction of capital expenditures not funded by internal funds. FL is a measure of dependence on trade credit
based on Fisman, Love (2003) calculated as ratio of accounts payable in total assets. TANG is dened as
property, plant and equipment in total assets and is taken from Kroszner et al (2007). The crisis dummy equals
to one in the year of the crisis and in the rst and second year after the crisis and is zero otherwise. The trade
share is the share of industry exports in total exports lagged three periods. The loss is dened as the deviation of
the predicted GDP from actual GDP over actual GDP. Either linear or quadratic trend is used for prediction. All
regressions include the exporter-year, exporter-product and year-product xed eects, coecients not reported.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signicance (p-value): *10%, **5%, ***1%
34Table 8: Does higher GDP alleviate the impact of the crisis on exporters?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trade share -0.683*** -0.679*** -0.675*** -0.680***







RZ*Crisis*GDP cap 2.73e-06** 3.86e-06***
(1.36e-06) (1.45e-06)
FL*Crisis*GDP cap -1.83e-05 -2.80e-05
(2.94e-05) (3.08e-05)
TANG*Crisis*GDP cap 6.37e-06 1.16e-05**
(4.38e-06) (4.79e-06)
Constant -0.130 0.204 -0.0900 0.202
(0.134) (0.129) (0.132) (0.129)
Observations 30753 30753 30753 30753
R-squared 0.275 0.275 0.275 0.275
Notes: The dependent variable is the log dierence of the gross export disaggregated at 4 digit ISIC level for
the period 1980-2006. RZ is the measure of external dependence based on Rajan, Zingales (1998) calculated
as fraction of capital expenditures not funded by internal funds. FL is a measure of dependence on trade
credit based on Fisman, Love (2003) calculated as ratio of accounts payable in total assets. TANG is dened
as property, plant and equipment in total assets and is taken from Kroszner et al (2007). The crisis dummy
equals to one in the year of the crisis and in the rst and second year after the crisis and is zero otherwise.
The trade share is the share of industry exports in total exports lagged three periods. The GDP cap variable
is the real GDP per capita expressed in US dollars and taken from WDI. All regressions include the exporter-
year, exporter-product and year-product xed eects, coecients not reported. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Signicance (p-value): *10%, **5%, ***1%
35Table 9: Developed countries
(1) (2) (3)














Constant -0.182 -0.185 0.146*
(0.152) (0.140) (0.0866)
Observations 30753 30753 30753
R-squared 0.275 0.275 0.275
Notes: The dependent variable is the log dierence of the gross export disaggregated at 4 digit ISIC level for
the period 1980-2006. RZ is the measure of external dependence based on Rajan, Zingales (1998) calculated as
fraction of capital expenditures not funded by internal funds. FL is a measure of dependence on trade credit
based on Fisman, Love (2003) calculated as ratio of accounts payable in total assets. TANG is dened as
property, plant and equipment in total assets and is taken from Kroszner et al (2007). The crisis dummy equals
to one in the year of the crisis and in the rst and second year after the crisis and is zero otherwise. The trade
share is the share of industry exports in total exports lagged three periods. The dummy developed takes value
of one when the country is classied as developed by the World Bank and is zero otherwise. All regressions
include the exporter-year, exporter-product and year-product xed eects, coecients not reported. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. Signicance (p-value): *10%, **5%, ***1%
36Table 10: Does higher nancial development alleviate the impact of the crisis on exporters?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Trade share -0.665*** -0.661*** -0.654*** -0.659*** -1.300***
(0.122) (0.122) (0.122) (0.122) (0.364)
RZ*Crisis -0.0952*** -0.0757** -0.144**
(0.0310) (0.0326) (0.0589)












Constant -0.487*** 0.0878 0.104 0.130* 0.382
(0.132) (0.103) (0.113) (0.0760) (0.374)
Observations 29126 29126 29126 29126 13815
R-squared 0.283 0.282 0.283 0.283 0.307
Notes: The dependent variable is the log dierence of the gross export disaggregated at 4 digit ISIC level for
the period 1980-2006. RZ is the measure of external dependence based on Rajan, Zingales (1998) calculated
as fraction of capital expenditures not funded by internal funds. FL is a measure of dependence on trade
credit based on Fisman, Love (2003) calculated as ratio of accounts payable in total assets. TANG is dened
as property, plant and equipment in total assets and is taken from Kroszner et al (2007). The crisis dummy
equals to one in the year of the crisis and in the rst and second year after the crisis and is zero otherwise.
The trade share is the share of industry exports in total exports lagged three periods. Financial development
is computed as private credit in GDP and taken from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt (2009). All regressions include
the exporter-year, exporter-product and year-product xed eects, coecients not reported. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Signicance (p-value): *10%, **5%, ***1%
37Table 11: Impact of policy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Trade share -1.085*** -1.085*** -1.089*** -1.083*** -1.084*** -1.089*** -1.084***
(0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149)
RZ*Crisis -0.0461** -0.0368* -0.0363** -0.0401** -0.0393** -0.0355* -0.0388*















Constant 0.660*** -0.0198 -0.103 -0.164 -0.104 -0.0497 -0.146
(0.0941) (0.0932) (0.102) (0.113) (0.104) (0.0960) (0.112)
Observations 20216 20216 20216 20216 20216 20216 20216
R-squared 0.329 0.329 0.329 0.329 0.329 0.329 0.329
Notes: The dependent variable is the log dierence of the gross export disaggregated at 4 digit ISIC level for
the period 1980-2006. RZ is the measure of external dependence based on Rajan, Zingales (1998) calculated
as fraction of capital expenditures not funded by internal funds. FL is a measure of dependence on trade
credit based on Fisman, Love (2003) calculated as ratio of accounts payable in total assets. TANG is dened
as property, plant and equipment in total assets and is taken from Kroszner et al (2007). The crisis dummy
equals to one in the year of the crisis and in the rst and second year after the crisis and is zero otherwise.
The trade share is the share of industry exports in total exports lagged three periods. Policy measures are
from Honohan and Klingebiel (2003). They include blanket depositor protection and two types of forbearance.
Forbearance of type A allows insolvent or illiquid banks to operate for 12 months. Forbearance of type B
means that either there is type A forbearance or some regulations are not enforced. Two additional measures
capture repeated recapitalizations and government sponsored debt relief for corporate or private borrowers.
These rst ve measures are captured as zero-one dummies. The policy total variable adds the dummies and
gives the number of policies that have been implemented during each crisis. The policy variables are always
included as a tripple interaction with external nance dependence and nancial crisis. All regressions include
the exporter-year, exporter-product and year-product xed eects, coecients not reported. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Signicance (p-value): *10%, **5%, ***1%
386.3 Appendix: Robustness
Table 12: Banking crisis just like any other economic distress?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Trade share -0.679*** -0.680*** -0.676*** -0.673*** -0.684*** -0.684*** -0.681*** -0.676***













Constant -0.168 -0.157 -0.213 -0.0940 -0.0932 -0.0688 -0.237 -0.248
(0.142) (0.147) (0.145) (0.114) (0.138) (0.125) (0.162) (0.161)
Observations 30753 30753 30753 30753 30753 30753 30753 30753
R-squared 0.275 0.275 0.275 0.275 0.275 0.275 0.275 0.275
Notes: The dependent variable is the log dierence of the gross export disaggregated at 4 digit ISIC level for the period 1980-2006. RZ is the measure
of external dependence based on Rajan, Zingales (1998) calculated as fraction of capital expenditures not funded by internal funds. FL is a measure of
dependence on trade credit based on Fisman, Love (2003) calculated as ratio of accounts payable in total assets. TANG is dened as property, plant and
equipment in total assets and is taken from Kroszner et al (2007). The crisis dummy equals to one in the year of the crisis and in the rst and second
year after the crisis and is zero otherwise. The trade share is the share of industry exports in total exports lagged three periods. The recession dummy
is based on Braun, Larrain (2005). GDP growth is taken from WDI. All regressions include the exporter-year, exporter-product and year-product xed
eects, coecients not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signicance (p-value): *10%, **5%, ***1%
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9Table 13: Alternative measures of external nance dependence and tangibility
Alternative measures of external dependence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trade share -0.657*** -0.680*** -0.675*** -0.674***
(0.115) (0.115) (0.111) (0.111)
RZ young *Crisis -0.0229**
(0.00986)






Constant -0.256 -0.0432 -0.151 -0.224**
(0.164) (0.143) (0.110) (0.106)
Observations 29908 30753 30916 30916
R-squared 0.277 0.275 0.271 0.271
Tangibility alternatives from Braun(2003)
(1) (2) (3)








Constant -0.373 -0.357 -0.386
(0.305) (0.306) (0.306)
Observations 30102 30102 30102
R-squared 0.273 0.273 0.273
Notes: RZ young is a measure of external dependence based on Rajan, Zingales (1998) calculated as fraction of capital expenditures
not funded by internal funds computed for rms listed for less than 10 years. RZ non crisis is based on Kroszner, Laeven, and
Klingebiel (2007) who compute the same measure based only on data of countries that have never experienced a nancial crisis.
INVSA and CCC are from Raddatz (2006). They are dened as cash conversion cycle and as inventories to sales and are meant to
capture short term nancial needs intended to cover mainly the working capital. TANG(Market) and TANG(Sales) are from Braun
(2003). These measures relate the book value of property, plant and equipment to market value of total assets and to total sales
respectively. All regressions include the exporter-year, exporter-product and year-product xed eects, coecients not reported.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signicance (p-value): *10%, **5%, ***1%
40Table 14: Are we measuring something else?
External dependence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Trade share -0.670*** -0.680*** -0.676*** -0.677*** -0.675***
(0.115) (0.115) (0.120) (0.115) (0.115)
RZ*Crisis -0.0485*** -0.0766*** -0.0351* -0.0481*** -0.0389**











Constant -0.229 -0.143 0.264** 0.369** 0.381***
(0.148) (0.127) (0.113) (0.155) (0.139)
Observations 30753 30753 23806 29689 29689
R-squared 0.275 0.275 0.272 0.274 0.274
Tangibility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trade share -0.675*** -0.674*** -0.675*** -0.676*** -0.672*** -0.672***
(0.115) (0.115) (0.120) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115)
TANG*Crisis 0.204*** 0.205*** 0.0935 0.278*** 0.202*** 0.218***







Phys cap intensity*Crisis -0.343
(0.305)
Nat res intensity*Crisis 0.00816
(0.0209)
Hum cap intensity*Crisis -0.00270
(0.0257)
Constant -0.182 -0.177 0.243** 0.346** 0.397*** 0.337**
(0.142) (0.143) (0.106) (0.152) (0.150) (0.141)
Observations 30753 30753 23806 29689 29689 29689
R-squared 0.275 0.275 0.272 0.274 0.274 0.274
Notes: The dependent variable is the log dierence of the gross export disaggregated at 4 digit ISIC level for the period 1980-2006.
Capital and R&D intensity are from Kroszner, Laeven, and Klingebiel (2007). The share of 20 largest intermediates and the
Herndahl index are capturing the complexity of a product and are taken from the work of Cowan and Neut (2007). The product
homogeneity is based on the Rauch (1999) classication of industries. Physical capital intensity, natural resources intensity are from
Braun (2003). All regressions include the exporter-year, exporter-product and year-product xed eects, coecients not reported.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signicance (p-value): *10%, **5%, ***1%
41Table 15: Excluding the poorest and richest countries
Poor countries out
(1) (2) (3)








Constant 0.338** 0.258 0.208*
(0.142) (0.228) (0.119)
Observations 25047 25047 25047
R-squared 0.290 0.289 0.290
Rich countries out
(1) (2) (3)








Constant 0.224 0.194 0.218
(0.151) (0.145) (0.161)
Observations 18505 18505 18505
R-squared 0.303 0.302 0.303
Notes: In the top panel we exclude the poorest countries with average real per capita income less than 1000USD. In the bottom
panel we exclude countries with average in sample per capita real income higher than 10000USD. The dependent variable is the log
dierence of the gross export disaggregated at 4 digit ISIC level for the period 1980-2006. RZ is the measure of external dependence
based on Rajan, Zingales (1998) calculated as fraction of capital expenditures not funded by internal funds. FL is a measure of
dependence on trade credit based on Fisman, Love (2003) calculated as ratio of accounts payable in total assets. TANG is dened
as property, plant and equipment in total assets and is taken from Kroszner et al (2007). The crisis dummy equals to one in the
year of the crisis and in the rst and second year after the crisis and is zero otherwise. The trade share is the share of industry
exports in total exports lagged three periods. All regressions include the exporter-year, exporter-product and year-product xed
eects, coecients not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signicance (p-value): *10%, **5%, ***1%
42Table 16: Excluding countries with more than one crisis
(1) (2) (3)








Constant 1.061*** 1.091*** 1.072***
(0.173) (0.164) (0.170)
Observations 24565 24565 24565
R-squared 0.297 0.297 0.297
Notes: Baseline regressions estimated for countries that only had one crisis. The dependent variable is the log
dierence of the gross export disaggregated at 4 digit ISIC level for the period 1980-2006. RZ is the measure of
external dependence based on Rajan, Zingales (1998) calculated as fraction of capital expenditures not funded
by internal funds. FL is a measure of dependence on trade credit based on Fisman, Love (2003) calculated as
ratio of accounts payable in total assets. TANG is dened as property, plant and equipment in total assets and
is taken from Kroszner et al (2007). The crisis dummy equals to one in the year of the crisis and in the rst
and second year after the crisis and is zero otherwise. The trade share is the share of industry exports in total
exports lagged three periods. All regressions include the exporter-year, exporter-product and year-product xed
eects, coecients not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signicance (p-value): *10%, **5%,
***1%
43Table 17: Small and large sectors
Large sectors
(1) (2) (3)








Constant -0.0253 0.370*** -0.107
(0.164) (0.108) (0.141)
Observations 15646 15646 15646
R-squared 0.398 0.397 0.398
Small sectors
(1) (2) (3)








Constant -0.487 -0.300 -0.238
(0.397) (0.367) (0.303)
Observations 15351 15351 15351
R-squared 0.377 0.377 0.377
Notes: The baseline regressions estimated for sectors larger than median in upper pannel and lower than median
share in total exports in the bottom panel. The dependent variable is the log dierence of the gross export
disaggregated at 4 digit ISIC level for the period 1980-2006. RZ is the measure of external dependence based
on Rajan, Zingales (1998) calculated as fraction of capital expenditures not funded by internal funds. FL is a
measure of dependence on trade credit based on Fisman, Love (2003) calculated as ratio of accounts payable in
total assets. TANG is dened as property, plant and equipment in total assets and is taken from Kroszner et al
(2007). The crisis dummy equals to one in the year of the crisis and in the rst and second year after the crisis
and is zero otherwise. The trade share is the share of industry exports in total exports lagged three periods. All
regressions include the exporter-year, exporter-product and year-product xed eects, coecients not reported.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signicance (p-value): *10%, **5%, ***1%
44Table 18: Contagious crises only
(1) (2) (3)








Constant 0.0859 0.453** 0.0851
(0.163) (0.200) (0.202)
Observations 14887 14887 14887
R-squared 0.335 0.334 0.335
Notes: Baseline regressions estimated only for countries that experienced a crisis which was most likely a
result of contagion and can be therefore considered an exogenous event. The dependent variable is the log
dierence of the gross export disaggregated at 4 digit ISIC level for the period 1980-2006. RZ is the measure of
external dependence based on Rajan, Zingales (1998) calculated as fraction of capital expenditures not funded
by internal funds. FL is a measure of dependence on trade credit based on Fisman, Love (2003) calculated as
ratio of accounts payable in total assets. TANG is dened as property, plant and equipment in total assets and
is taken from Kroszner et al (2007). The crisis dummy equals to one in the year of the crisis and in the rst
and second year after the crisis and is zero otherwise. The trade share is the share of industry exports in total
exports lagged three periods. All regressions include the exporter-year, exporter-product and year-product xed
eects, coecients not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signicance (p-value): *10%, **5%,
***1%
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